Locke's Argument for the Conclusion of the Primary Qualities of Essay

Lockes Argument for the Conclusion of the Primary Qualities of Objects and the Secondary Qualities of Objects - Essay ExampleI shall deal that the an nonation is well-grounded and interesting, that Locke had grasped an important truth about it, and that Berkeleys treatment of this matter is impercipient and unhelpful. Berkeley assimilated the primary/ second-string distinction to that monolithic theory of material substance which he thought he detected in Lockes writings and I shall contend that that is the dominating fact about his failure to deal competently with the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.Locke has two general, true things to say about the primary/ secondary distinction. One of them is his thesis that primary qualities ar such as are utterly inseparable from the body, in what state so ever it be and such as in all the alterations and changes it suffers, all the force can be used upon it, it ceaselessly keeps and such as sense constantly finds in every particle of matter which has bulk decent to be perceived.In most of Lockes theorizing, a things primary qualities are taken to consist in its existence spherical, two feet across, and falling rapidly but here they are thought of rather as a things being shaped, of some size, mobile, etc. That is, in the thesis that primary qualities are ones which a body cannot lose, it is calculable qualities which are in question and not determinate ones. Lockes example reinforces this reading Take a grain of wheat, apportion it into two parts each part has still solidity, extension, figure, and mobility divide it again, and it retains still the same qualities. It is not unload that solidity is a determinable, either in its normal meaning or in Lockes specialized sense in which solid means impenetrable. Locke has a good point here, but he ought not to express it as though it were a prediction about the outcome of an experiment, for really it is a point about the meaning of the enunciat e body, or about the concept of a body or a physical thing. Indeed the record book primary for Locke partly means that these are qualities a thing essential have to count as a body. Lockes discussions of the concept of body involve detailed points which are of some interest but which lie beyond my present scope. His general thesis that the raw materials which constitute the concept of body are to be comprise within the realm of primary qualities, and that secondary qualities are conceptually inessential, seems safe enough. Yet Berkeley apparently denies it It is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moved, but I must(prenominal) withal give it some color or other sensible quality . . . In short, extension, figure, and motion, negligent from all other qualities, are inconceivable. The quoted passage is, as it stands, true a things being extended, or its fetching up space, must involve some spatial regions being occupied by something--some quality must be manif ested in that region other than mere extension. But the quality could be solidity, which is on Lockes count of primary qualities. If Berkeley really is saying only that body could not be defined out of extension, figure and motion, without resort hotel to solidity, then